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Abstract:
Economists claim that principles of rationality are normative principles. Nevertheless,
they go on to explain why it is in a person’s own interest to be rational. If this were true,
being rational itself would be a means to an end, and rationality could be interpreted in
a non-normative or naturalistic way. The alternative is not attractive: if the only argu-
ment in favor of principles of rationality were their intrinsic appeal, a commitment to
rationality would be irrational, making the notion of rationality self-defeating. A com-
prehensive conception of rationality should recommend itself: it should be rational to be
rational. Moreover, since rational action requires rational beliefs concerning means-ends
relations, a naturalistic conception of rationality has to cover rational belief formation in-
cluding the belief that it is rational to be rational. The paper considers four conceptions
of rationality and asks whether they can deliver the goods: Bayesianism, perfect ratio-
nality (just in case that it differs from Bayesianism), ecological rationality (as a version of
bounded rationality), and critical rationality, the conception of rationality characterizing
critical rationalism. The answer is summarized in the paper’s title.
1. Rationality in Economics
In economics, it is often assumed that rationality is described by a set of norma-
tive principles. Consider the transitivity axiom for preferences, which belongs to
the basic principles of rationality in economics. Of course, economists know that,
actually, people often violate the transitivity axiom. They consider the transitiv-
ity axiom as a theoretical idealization and, at the same time, a normative ideal:
a person’s preferences ought to be transitive. And it seems that most people
accept this norm. Thus, experimental subjects who are confronted with the fact
* This paper is based on a talk at the 25th Roland Seminar at the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics in Jena 2008, where Hartmut Kliemt invited me to speak on “rationality in connection
with experimental economics”. I have proﬁted from discussions with seminar participants, es-
pecially Michael Baurmann, Werner Güth, Susanne Hahn, and Bernd Lahno. My greatest and
longstanding debts, however, are to Hartmut Kliemt, with whom I have been discussing economics
and philosophy since my student days when I ﬁrst met him in Alpbach.50 Max Albert
that they have stated intransitive preferences typically concede that they have
made a mistake and correct themselves.
But economists usually do not leave it at that. They present a further ar-
gument in favor of transitivity, explaining why it is in a person’s own interest
to avoid intransitive preferences. This is the famous money-pump argument,
which shows that a person with intransitive preferences can, in the worst case,
be exploited systematically through trade.1
The money-pump argument, however, suggests that there is nothing norma-
tive about the transitivity axiom. According to the argument, transitivity pro-
tects against losses and, consequently, is a means for achieving an end. State-
ments about the relation between means and ends are not normative. It is either
true or false that transitivity offers such a protection; this is not a question of
norms or value judgments. If people want to protect themselves and believe
that transitive preferences are an effective means of protection, it is rational for
them to correct any intransitivities in their preferences, at least if no other of
their goals are affected.2 Transitivity as a normative requirement is superﬂu-
ous.
The money-pump argument suggests that the conception of rationality used
in economics might be naturalistic, that is, non-normative. Indeed, economists
should hope that a naturalistic interpretation of rationality is possible because
the alternative is not very attractive. Assume that the only argument in favor
of principles of rationality would be their intrinsic appeal. We would then have
to say that a commitment to rationality is irrational, which makes the notion
of rationality self-defeating. A comprehensive conception of rationality should
recommend itself, that is, it should be rational to be rational (cf. also Bartley
1987; Musgrave 1993, 294–297; 1999, 329–331, 336–337).3
There are two objections against a naturalistic conception of rationality.
First, it is sometimes argued that there is one normative principle that cannot
be avoided in a discussion of rationality, namely, that one should be rational (see
Wallace 2009, section 4). Second, it is argued that rational action requires that
1 See Kliemt 2009, 45, where the money-pump argument (though not under this name) is used to
characterize intransitivity as pragmatic incoherence. The possibility of systematic exploitation
just adds drama to the argument; trading with several well-meaning partners can lead to the
same result.
2 The tension between the idea of given preferences in economics and arguments like the money-
pump argument can be dissolved if preferences are viewed as summarizing all considerations
a person considers to be relevant in a decision between different options (Kliemt 2009, section
3.2). According to this concept of “preferences all things considered” (or “satiated preferences”,
see Kliemt 2009, 124), transitivity is the result of deliberation and can be viewed as a means to
an end, as the money-pump argument assumes.
3 There is an easy way, however, to make such a conception of rationality comprehensive. Con-
sider the rather silly normative principle that it is rational to accept all intrinsically appealing
principles. If this principle intrinsically appeals to you, it recommends itself. Let us call this ver-
sion of rationality ‘uncritical rationality’. Uncritical rationality requires that you accept all other
principles you ﬁnd intrinsically appealing, for instance, transitivity of preferences. Uncritical ra-
tionality is analogous to the epistemology of rationalism with its notion of self-evident truth. The
challenge for a normative conception of rationality is to ﬁnd a self-recommending version that is
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the beliefs concerning means-ends relations are rational, and that normative
principles determine the rationality of beliefs.
The ﬁrst objection seems to me unfounded. Consider Indiana Jones at the
Shanghai night club where he has been poisened but ﬁnally manages to get his
hands on the phial with the antidot. He has good reasons—well, not really, but
let’s pretend—for believing that he will survive if and only if he swallows the
antidot; moreover, he wants to survive, and there are no other relevant goals
or beliefs. This motivates him to swallow the antidot. He needs no argument
with the normative conclusion that he ought to do so. Such an argument would
indeed require some normative principle as a premise. However, a theory of
rational action can do without such an argument because, at some point, it has to
assume anyway that people are motivated to act. Goals and beliefs are sufﬁcient
as a motivation; normative principles are superﬂuous.
The same goes for a conception of rationality. When we say that swallow-
ing the antidot is rational for Indiana Jones, this just means that he has good
reasons to believe that this is an effective means for reaching his goals.4
The second objection against a naturalistic conception of rationality poses
more difﬁculties. It would not be rational for Indiana Jones to swallow the anti-
dot if he had no good reasons for believing that this was an effective means for
reaching his goals. We therefore have to extend rationality to beliefs.
Traditionally, the rationality of beliefs is viewed as a problem of theoretical
rationality, while the rational choice of actions falls into the realm of practical
rationality (Wallace 2009). However, it seems to me that we could view both,
belief formation and the choice of actions, as decision problems. A relevant hy-
pothesis can be viewed as a solution proposal to the decision problem of what to
believe in a certain situation. Thus, an effective means for distinguishing true
from false hypotheses would solve the problem of rational belief formation in a
naturalistic way.
It is, of course, clear that there can be no sure-ﬁre method for ﬁnding true
beliefs. Any method for forming beliefs must be a heuristic in the sense that
it cannot deliver true beliefs with certainty or even with some known objective
probability.5 All we can hope for are heuristics with good working properties.
In this paper, I will consider four conceptions of rationality and ask whether
they can do the job described above: Bayesianism, perfect rationality (just in
case that it differs from Bayesianism), ecological rationality (as a version of
bounded rationality), and critical rationality, the conception of rationality char-
acterizing critical rationalism. The focus will be on belief formation, starting
from the problem of induction. The results of the paper are already summarized
in its title.
4 Thus, as argued by Kliemt, the participant’s attitude, according to which we place ourselves in the
shoes of others, and the objective attitude of a rational-choice explanation with goals and beliefs
as initial conditions are complements; cf. Kliemt 2009, section 2.3, especially 31–32.
5 This follows from modern epistemology; see Musgrave 1993 for an introduction.52 Max Albert
2. Bayesian Rationality
2.1 A Simple Illustration of the Problem of Induction
Irrationalism, or radical skepticism, is a resignative answer to the problem of
induction. Irrationalists argue that, since the past teaches us nothing about the
future, any beliefs and any decisions are as rational or irrational as any other,
no matter what our goals and experiences are.
As a simple illustration of this point, consider the set of all possible worlds,
illustrated by the rectangle in ﬁgure 1, where the probabilities can be ignored
for now. The actual world is a point in the rectangle; each other point is another
possible world. Before any experience, we cannot know which of the inﬁnitely
many possible worlds is the actual world.
Events are represented by subsets of the set of possible worlds. Each event
corresponds to the set of those possible worlds where the event occurs. Let X and
Y be two variables denoting observable events. First, we will observe whether
X Æ 0 or X Æ 1; later, we will observe whether Y Æ 0 or Y Æ 1. Each variable
corresponds to a partitioning of the rectangle; there are four sets of possible
worlds, each characterized by one possible realization of (X,Y).
 
X = 0 
P(X = 0)=0.60 
X = 1 
P(X = 1)=0.40 
Y = 0 
P(Y = 0)=0.50 
Y = 1 





Figure 1: Set of all posible worlds partitioned into four quadrants, corresponding to the
four possible realizations of (X,Y), and prior probability distribution P with P(X Æ i,
Y Æ j)Æ pij,i, j Æ0,1.
Once we have observed X, we know whether the actual world is on the left-
hand side or the right-hand side in ﬁgure 1. However, this tells us nothing about
Y, that is, whether the actual world is in the top or in the bottom part. Thus,
we may believe what we want about Y (the future) after having observed X
(the past). Any beliefs about the future, and, consequently, any decisions are as
rational or irrational as any other, no matter what our goals and experiences
are. This is the problem of induction.Why Bayesian Rationality Is Empty ... 53
2.2 The Bayesian Recipe
Bayesianism tries to solve the problem of induction with the help of the proba-
bility calculus.6 The following recipe describes the Bayesian account of rational
learning and decision making.
1. Select prior probabilities: Choose a prior probability distribution on the
set of all possible worlds. From this distribution, derive probabilities for
future events and use them for predictions and decision making.
2. Compute posterior probabilities: After observing some event, adopt a new
probability distribution called posterior probability distribution. The pos-
terior probabilities for all future events are equal to the prior probabilities
conditional on the observation. Henceforth, use the posterior probabilities
for predictions and decision making.7
3. Repeat ad inﬁnitum: Any further observation leads to further condition-
ing. The posterior probabilities at one stage serve as prior probabilities at
the next. This process of updating probabilites on the basis of observations
is called Bayesian learning.
Step 1 of the Bayesian recipe calls for the choice of a prior distribution, subse-
quently denoted by P. Imagine this as a heap of whipped cream distributed on
the surface of the rectangle in ﬁgure 1. The distribution may be very uneven,
with only a thin spread or no cream at all at one place and big heaps at other
places. The probability of each event is the share of cream covering the corre-
sponding set of possible worlds. Let us assume that the shares of cream on the
four quadrants are as given by the numbers pij in ﬁgure 1. Thus, 30% of all the
cream is on the top-right quarter, meaning that P(X Æ1,Y Æ0)Æ p10 Æ0.30.
The initial choice of a prior probability distribution is not regulated in any
way. The probabilities, called subjective or personal probabilities, reﬂect per-
sonal degrees of belief. From a Bayesian philosopher’s point of view, any prior
distribution is as good as any other. Of course, from a Bayesian decision maker’s
point of view, his own beliefs, as expressed in his prior distribution, may be
better than any other beliefs, but Bayesianism provides no means of justifying
this position. Bayesian rationality rests in the recipe alone, and the choice of
the prior probability distribution is arbitrary as far as the issue of rationality
is concerned. Thus, two rational persons with the same goals may adopt prior
distributions that are wildly different.
Step 2 of the Bayesian recipe uses the concept of a conditional probability,
that is, the probability of one event, say, Y Æ0, on the condition that some other
event, say, X Æ 1, occurs. The conditional probability of Y Æ 0 given X Æ 1 is
denoted by P(Y Æ 0jX Æ 1). In terms of cream, we ask which percentage of
6 For expositions and critical discussions of Bayesianism, see Albert 2001, 2003; Binmore 2009;
Earman 1992; Gillies 2001; and Howson and Urbach 1993. In this paper, I am only concerned
with subjective Bayesianism. Albert (2003), Earman (1992, 139–141) and Howson and Urbach
(1993, ch. 4 and 15i) also criticize objective Bayesianism.
7 If the observed event has a prior probability of zero, conditional probabilities are not deﬁned, and
the posterior distribution can be chosen freely. I do not consider this possibility explicitly, as this
would only complicate the exposition without changing the conclusions.54 Max Albert
the cream covering the right-hand side (representing X Æ 1) is in the upper
part (representing Y Æ 0). According to ﬁgure 1, 40% of the cream is on the
right-hand side and 30% of the cream is in the top-right quarter. Therefore,
30/40 £ 100% = 75% of the right-hand side’s cream is in the upper part; hence,
P(Y Æ0jX Æ1)Æ p10/(p10Å p11)Æ0.75.
Bayesian learning requires that, after observing the value of X, we adopt
the respective conditional probabilities as posterior probabilities, subsequently
denoted by Pnew. Let us assume that we observe X Æ 1. We know, then, that
the actual world must be on the right-hand side. Our new probabilities are
the old probabilities conditional on the event we have observed: Pnew(Y Æ 0) Æ
P(Y Æ0jX Æ1)Æ0.75.
In terms of cream, Bayesian learning implies that cream never moves. Once
we have learned that the actual world must be on the right-hand side, the left-
hand side and all the cream on it are just forgotten. All that counts for further
considerations is the right-hand side with the original amount and distribution
of cream.
2.3 Back to Irrationalism
Given the prior probability distribution of ﬁgure 1, the Bayesian recipe forces
us to conclude that the probability of Y Æ0 rises from 0.50 to 0.75 if we observe
X Æ 1. According to this recipe, then, we are no longer free in our beliefs after
observing X. Does this mean that the problem of induction has been solved?
In order to answer this question, we have to distinguish between ﬂexibility
and arbitrariness. Bayesian learning is completely inﬂexible after the initial
choice of probabilities: all beliefs that result from new observations have been
ﬁxed in advance. This holds because the new probabilities are just equal to
certain old conditional probabilities (or, in terms of cream, because cream never
moves).
However, the problem of induction is the arbitrariness of beliefs. Inﬂexibility
may be accompanied by arbitrariness or not, depending on whether each and any
sequence of beliefs could be ﬁxed in advance or whether at least some sequences
are ruled out. According to the Bayesian recipe, the initial choice of a prior
probability distribution is arbitrary. But the probability calculus might still rule
out some sequences of beliefs and thus prevent complete arbitrariness.
Actually, however, this is not the case: nothing is ruled out by the probability
calculus. The example of ﬁgure 1 shows why. We have P(X Æ1) Æ p10Å p11 and
Pnew(Y Æ 0) Æ p10/(p10 Å p11). If we are free to choose p10 andp11 in any way
we want, beliefs concerning Y after observing X Æ1 are completely independent
from beliefs concerning X. In terms of cream: the decision of how cream should
be distributed between left and right is independent from the decision of how, on
each side, it is distributed between top and bottom.
Thus, anything goes. Observing X Æ 1 can have any impact on our proba-
bility for Y Æ 0 we like it to have. The past does not tell us anything about the
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and their probabilities. Bayesian rationality allows us to learn what we want
from the past. By adopting a suitable prior probability distribution, we can ﬁx
the consequences of any observations for our beliefs in any way we want. This
result, which will be referred to as the anything-goes theorem, holds for arbitrar-
ily complicated cases and any number of observations. It implies, among other
consequences, that two rational persons with the same goals and experiences
can, in all eternity, differ arbitrarily in their beliefs about future events.8
Keeping to the Bayesian recipe, then, cannot, by and in itself, help us make
better decisions. It just burdens us with a lot of calculations. Moreover, it seems
that there is nothing else we get from it. Indeed, no matter what we do and
what we would like to achieve, we can rest assured in the certain knowledge—
at least as far as certainty is to be had in mathematics—that there exists a prior
probability distribution that rationalizes our beliefs and actions, and even all
our contingent plans, in terms of Bayesian learning.
From a Bayesian point of view, any beliefs and, consequently, any decisions
are as rational or irrational as any other, no matter what our goals and experi-
ences are. Bayesian rationality is just a probabilistic version of irrationalism.
Bayesians might say that somebody is rational only if he actually rationalizes
his actions in the Bayesian way. However, given that such a rationalization
always exists, it seems a bit pedantic to insist that a decision maker should
actually provide it.
2.4 Bayesian Replies
This line of criticism usually meets four replies. First, it is often said that
Bayesianism provides the deﬁnition of rationality. Thus, proceeding along
Bayesian lines is rational by deﬁnition, and that is all there is to say. Sec-
ond, Bayesians often cite the old adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’, meaning that,
of course, we get absurd results from the Bayesian machinery when we feed it
with absurd prior probabilities. Third, with respect to decision making, it is
said that the decisions taken by a Bayesian decision maker are optimal in the
decision maker’s eyes; the fact that another prior probability distribution would
lead to other decisions is not a valid criticism from the decision maker’s point of
view. Fourth, Bayesians provide examples where the Bayesian calculus actually
excludes some possibilities or leads to deﬁnitive results.
All four replies fail to answer the criticism raised above. First, Bayesianism
was meant as an answer to irrationalism, that is, as a solution to a speciﬁc prob-
lem. I have argued that it is just a restatement of irrationalism in probabilistic
terms. How Bayesians would like to use the word ‘rationality’ is completely ir-
relevant for this, or any other, substantive issue.
Second, ‘garbage in, garbage out’ also misses the point. Irrationalism says
that there is no difference between garbage and no garbage. Bayesianism was
8 For the anything-goes theorem, see Albert 2001; 2003 and, for a formal proof, 1999, theorem 1.
Theorem 2 in Albert 1999 is mistaken and should be ignored.56 Max Albert
supposed to tell the garbage from the rest. If the Bayesian calculus needs to
be fed the solution to the problem it was meant to solve, it is a failure.
Third, it is irrelevant for the evaluation of Bayesianism whether Bayesians
are convinced that their decisions are optimal. After all, non-Bayesians may also
be convinced that their decisions are optimal, but Bayesians would not count
these convictions as arguments against Bayesianism.
Fourth, the fact that the Bayesian calculus seems to have some bite in statis-
tics and decision making is simply due to the fact that, in these applications,
only a few prior probability distributions are taken into consideration. This is
done mainly by assuming that a lot of things are impossible. For instance, the
Bayesian calculus immediately leads to sharp conclusions once we set p00 Æ 0
and p11 Æ 0 in ﬁgure 1. This is just the point of the anything-goes theorem:
any conclusions result from the choice of the prior probability distribution, but
Bayesianism does not help us in choosing this distribution.
Let me focus on one argument that, historically, has been an especially im-
portant selling point for Bayesianism: the Dutch book argument.9 This argu-
ment considers a decision maker who must, for all possible bets on events, state
his subjectively fair odds, that is, the odds at which he would take either side
of the bet. A bookmaker is then allowed to select any number of bets, the side
the decision maker has to take, and the (monetary) stakes. Then, the selected
bets are played out and the decision maker wins or loses money depending on
the course of events. How should the decision maker choose the odds?
Since the Dutch book argument concerns only probabilities, we can for the
moment assume that the decision maker is risk neutral and interested only in
the monetary payoffs from his bets. For a Bayesian, the subjectively fair odds
must then be equal to the ratio of subjective probabilities. For instance, in our
numerical example, the fair odds for a bet on X Æ 0 are P(X Æ 0)/P(X 6Æ 0) Æ
0.60/0.40Æ 3:2 since X 6Æ0 means X Æ1. In a bet on X Æ0 with odds 3:2, where
the winner gets S (the stakes), the person betting on X Æ 0 contributes 0.60S
and the person betting against X Æ0 contributes 0.40S.
Let us call the set of odds coherent if all the odds are based in this way on
a single subjective probability distribution. If and only if a decision maker’s
odds are incoherent, a bookmaker can pick some bets in such a way that the
decision maker will lose money no matter what happens. Such a set of bets is
called a Dutch book. For instance, a simple case of incoherent odds is 3:2 for
X Æ0 and 3:2 for X Æ1. If the decision maker states these odds, the bookmaker
takes the less favored side of both bets at equal stakes S. This is a Dutch book.
The decision maker pays two times 0.60S and wins one of the bets, receiving S.
9 The Dutch book argument is a probabilistic version of the money-pump argument. It can be used,
less ambitiously, to argue that numerical degrees of belief used as decision weights should obey
the axioms of the probability calculus; see Hájek 2009 for a survey of the literature. My criticism
of the argument, however, is that it has no force if one rejects the assumption that degrees of
belief are necessary, as, e.g., critical rationalits and classical statisticians do. The modiﬁcations of
the Dutch book argument discussed by Hájek are irrelevant to this line of criticism; therefore, I
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This leaves the decision maker with a loss of 0.2S and the bookmaker with a
corresponding proﬁt.
Betting on the basis of a prior probability distribution, then, may protect
against accepting a Dutch book. While this is correct as far as it goes, it is hardly
convincing as an argument in favor of Bayesianism. First of all, the Dutch book
argument assumes a situation where some option (accepting a Dutch book) is
worse than others (for instance, not betting), no matter what happens. In order
to avoid such strictly dominated options, no subjective probabilities are needed.
Thus, non-Bayesians would also reject Dutch books. Second, and crucially, the
problem of induction implies that there are no strictly dominated options; strict
dominance requires that we have already excluded certain things as impossible.
Therefore, the Bayesian promise of protection is empty.10
3. The Dilemma of Perfect Rationality
In economics, two different conceptions of rationality are used: perfect ratio-
nality and bounded rationality. The usual exposition goes like this (Simon 1987;
Gigerenzer and Selten 2001; Selten 2001). Perfect rationality, which is identiﬁed
with Bayesian rationality, is the practically unachievable but theoretically and
normatively important ideal version of rationality. Bounded rationality, in con-
trast, is the rationality of actual human decision making. It is often identiﬁed
with rule-following behavior, where the rules (or heuristics) may perform well
in some situations but rather badly in others. As the name already suggests,
bounded rationality is viewed as inferior to perfect rationality. Boundedly ratio-
nal agents intend to be rational but fail; they are constrained by their limited
cognitive capacities. In order to be perfectly rational, they would need superhu-
man intellectual powers: infallible and complete memory, lightning speed and
perfect accuracy in complicated calculations, and so on.11
In this exposition, one crucial ingredient is missing. What, exactly, are the
hypothetical advantages of being perfectly rational? Intellectual superpowers
are just the inputs needed for achieving perfection. What is the value added of
perfect rationality?
In the last section, I have argued that there is no value added if perfect ra-
tionality is identiﬁed with Bayesianism. Is there any other candidate for perfect
rationality that would do a better job? This is hard to tell since it is unclear what
perfect rationality is meant to achieve. However, arguments like the Dutch book
10 The Dutch book argument creates an illusion of certainty by excluding the actual betting process
from the set of possible worlds. If, however, betting behavior is included in the set of possible
worlds, it cannot be ruled out that events are inﬂuenced by the parties’ betting behavior. A trivial
example: The decision maker may accept a Dutch book with a certain loss of one thousand euros
because he believes that this will make his rich uncle Bill take pity on him and send a gift of one
million.
11 Gigerenzer and Selten (2001a, 9) seem to oppose the standard view that perfect rationality is
better in some sense than bounded rationality. In the same volume, however, Selten (2001, 13–
15) views Bayesian rationality as the (unachievable) ideal.58 Max Albert
argument and discussions comparing perfect and bounded rationality (Gigeren-
zer 2001, 40–43) suggest two criteria as necessary for perfection: being perfectly
rational should help us to achieve our goals, and the principles of perfect ratio-
nality should be independent of the environment.
Once the two criteria are on the table, however, it becomes rather obvious
that perfect rationality does not exist. The argument can be stated as follows.
Premise 1 (usefulness):
If it exists, perfect rationality is useful in all possible worlds.
Premise 2 (apriorism):
If it exists, perfect rationality is the same in all possible worlds.
Conclusion:
Perfect rationality does not exist.
Of course, the premises are somewhat imprecise, but they should sufﬁce even
in the present form to convey the message. In order to be useful, perfect ratio-
nality must say more than just ‘anything goes’; it must restrict decision making
such that being perfectly rational is advantageous. However, for any kind of
restriction, we can imagine some world where a given restriction on decision
making is disadvantageous. Hence, usefulness and apriorism are inconsistent,
and perfect rationality does not exist.
The argument above, then, gives rise to a dilemma. Any conception of ratio-
nality must give up either usefulness or apriorism. I have shown in the preced-
ing section that Bayesianism satisﬁes apriorism at the price of uselessness. In
the next section, I explore the alternative of giving up apriorism.
4. From Ecological to Critical Rationality
4.1 Belief Formation as a Decision Problem
When we consider belief formation as a decision problem, we have to state a
goal ﬁrst. The goal in rational belief formation is to accept (that is, believe) true
statements and to reject false statements (which means to accept the negation
of false statements, which are true). A naturalistic conception of rational belief
formation requires that we use decision rules that we can rationally believe to be
effective in achieving this goal. Or rather, since a comparative judgment seems
to sufﬁce: decision rules that we can rationally believe to be at least as effective
as any of their competitors.
There are several rules that are typically accepted as rules of rational belief
formation. First, it is rational to believe the deductive consequences of rational
beliefs. Second, it is rational to believe what one observes (observational be-
liefs), at least under certain circumstances. We will consider only conceptions
of rationality that accept these rules; for this reason, we skip any discussion of
them.12
12 Deductive logic as well as observational beliefs can be criticized. In fact, deductive logic as we
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Classical inductivism, the philosophical precursor of Bayesianism, assumes
that it is rational to believe in non-deductive, or inductive, consequences of ra-
tional (speciﬁcally, observational) beliefs. However, non-deductive arguments
are equivalent to deductive arguments with additional premises. In the con-
text of inductivism, these additional premises are called inductive principles.
Given that inductive principles are not themselves inductive or deductive con-
sequences of rational beliefs, classical inductivism is necessarily incomplete: it
contains no rule that allows for rational belief in inductive principles. Conse-
quently, it adds nothing to the ﬁrst two rules.
The ﬁrst two rules, however, are not sufﬁcient for solving the problem of
induction. According to them, it is never rational to believe any proposition
about future events or, more generally, events that have not yet been observed.
Hence, if one restricts rational belief formation to the application of these two
rules, irrationalism cannot be avoided. A different conclusion requires adding at
least one further rule. This rule must be useful and it must recommend itself: it
should be rational to be rational.
4.2 Ecological Rationality
Useful principles of rationality cannot be useful in all possible worlds; they must
be adapted to the world we actually live in. Adaptation to the environment fea-
tures prominently in “ecological rationality” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; 2001; Todd
and Gigerenzer 2000, 2007). This conception of rationality is based on a spe-
ciﬁc theory of decision making, the adaptive-toolbox theory, which is a version of
bounded rationality.
According to the adaptive-toolbox theory, decision makers use decision heur-
istics that are composed of cognitive and emotional building blocks. The building
blocks form an adaptive toolbox: they can be recombined to form new heuristics
that are adapted to new tasks. Heuristics are domain-speciﬁc and can take
advantage of the actual structure of their domain of application. If they are
adapted to the environment in which they are used, they can be successful as
well as ‘fast and frugal’, that is, they can work well within the limits of human
cognitive capacities. Of course, heuristics are no algorithms; they are not guar-
anteed to ﬁnd a correct solution to a problem. Nevertheless, they may work
better than alternatives like random decision making.
Consider the following example of a simple decision task (Todd and Gigeren-
zer 2000, 732–733). Experimental subjects are asked, for several pairs of cities,
to decide which of the two has more inhabitants. Typically, subjects do not know
the answers; they have to guess. However, if they recognize the name of only
one city in a pair, more likely than not the name they recognize is the name of
the larger city. This holds because the names of larger cities come up more often
in conversations or the news, which makes it more likely that subjects recognize
these names.
beliefs from the standpoint of criticial rationalism, see Andersson 1994; and Musgrave 1999, 341–
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Thus, choosing the option one recognizes is a good and intellectually unde-
manding heuristic in this decision problem. It is, however, domain speciﬁc; it
cannot even be applied to problems where all options or no options are recog-
nized. Moreover, in order to use this heuristic, subjects need to know that name
recognition is correlated with size. If they blindly decided, in every kind of com-
parison between two cities, for the city whose name they recognize, one could
easily trick them by asking after the smaller city or the city with more cows per
head of population.
The adaptive-toolbox theory is not at issue here. What concerns us is the
conception of ecological rationality. Their proponents describe it in the following
words:
“The ‘rationality’ of domain-speciﬁc heuristics is not in optimization,
omniscience, or consistency. Their success (and failure) is in their
degree of adaptation to the structure of environments, both physical
and social. The study of the match between heuristics and environ-
mental structures is the study of ecological rationality.” (Gigerenzer
2001, 38)
“[B]ecause the human mind has been shaped by the adaptive pro-
cesses of evolution and learning, we predict that people will tend
to be ecologically rational themselves, often using simple decision
heuristics that confer the twin advantages of speed and accuracy in
particular environments.” (Todd and Gigerenzer 2007, 169)
However, these passages state only some requirements for a conception of ratio-
nality, while the city-size example—together with other examples—illustrates
only the basic idea of heuristics adapted to the environment. The organization
of the adaptive toolbox, and the crucial point of rational belief formation in par-
ticular, is left in the dark.
Of course, the city-size example considers the formation of beliefs about the
relative size of cities. However, it is assumed that subjects already know that
city size is correlated with name recognition. This known correlation serves
as an inductive principle, transforming belief formation into a simple case of
deduction: given the correlation and the fact that only one name was recognized,
it follows deductively that it is more probable than not that this name belongs to
the larger city. However, as has already been explained, the problem of rational
belief formation cannot be solved by assuming given inductive principles.
The city-size example, then, leaves open the question of how to ﬁnd the right
heuristic (or the right inductive princple). For choosing between heuristics, Todd
and Gigerenzer (2000, 771) propose a further layer of meta-heuristics build from
the same components as the lower-level heuristics. This, of course, invites the
question of how to choose between meta-heuristics. Todd and Gigerenzer stop
the incipient regress of heuristics, conjecturing that meta-heuristics are tried in
the order of past successfulness, where the ordering is provided by a process of
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From this description, it remains unclear how much is assumed to be known
by the decision maker. Anyway, the highest level of the adaptive toolbox is a
process of reinforcement learning. While reinforcement learning may describe
some aspects of actual human decision making, it is certainly not a candidate
for the decision rule we are searching for. Even if one could argue that it is
rational to learn in this way, reinforcement learning cannot recommend itself.
As a conception of rationality, ecological rationality is too simple.
4.3 Critical Rationality
In contrast to ecological rationality, critical rationalism explicitly proposes a
third decision rule for rational belief formation: it is rational to believe a hy-
pothesis if it has so far withstood serious criticism better than its competitors.13
Criticism proceeds by deduction. The most prominent case of criticism is
falsiﬁcation, where a hypothesis is shown to be inconsistent with observational
beliefs. In the case of a falsiﬁcation, a hypothesis is rejected independently of
the fate of its competitors because a falsiﬁcation means that a hypothesis has
succumbed to criticism. The same holds in the case where it is shown that a
theory is contradictory. In the case of metaphysical hypotheses, criticism may
be comparative; for instance, if all competing hypotheses have the same unfor-
tunate consequence, this would usually not count against any of them. Much of
the content of critical rationality lies in the various lower-level principles of how
to criticize beliefs, including various domain-speciﬁc scientiﬁc methodologies.14
The difference between critical rationalism and classical inductivism is that
critical rationalism allows us to believe in a hypothesis without providing some
deductive or non-deductive argument with the hypothesis as a conclusion. There
exists a deductive argument with the conclusion that it is rational to believe in
the hypothesis, but this conclusion is a statement about the hypothesis, not the
hypothesis itself. As Musgrave (1999) argues, the deductive argument is an
argument in favor of believing the hypothesis—an act or a decision—, not an
argument for the hypothesis. This makes a big difference. First, since it is a
deductive argument, there is no inductive principle or other missing premise
whose rational acceptability must be shown. Second, since the conclusion is not
13 The following summary of critical rationalism is based on the much more detailed account by
Musgrave 1993, ch. 15; 1999. Speciﬁcally, for the full version of critical rationalism, which takes
observational beliefs and epistemic division of labor into account, see Musgrave 1999, 347–350.
Some critical rationalists disagree with Musgrave, most prominently Miller 1994; on this debate,
see Musgrave 1999, 332–336.
14 In my view, critical rationality can also be viewed as deﬁning a process for reaching, by criticism,
a reﬂective equilibrium where all beliefs are rational. There are several other versions of the idea
of a reﬂective equilibrium: Rawls’ and Goodman’s version are discussed by Hahn 2004. I would
add the Savage-Binmore variant of Bayesianism where one should massage the prior until one
can accept its hypothetical consequences (Binmore 2009). All these other ideas of reﬂective equi-
librium seem to lack a good description of the dynamics leading to equilibrium. See, in contrast,
Kliemt 2009, 37–41; Kliemt uses theory absorption as a critical argument in order to derive the
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the hypothesis itself, there is no presumption that the premises already imply
the hypothesis.
When we say that it is rational to believe a hypothesis that so far has with-
stood serious criticism better than any competitor, we claim that this decision
rule is at least as effective in accepting true hypotheses and rejecting false hy-
potheses as any competing decision rule. To believe this claim is rational be-
cause critical rationality has withstood serious criticism better than competing
rules. Thus, critical rationality recommends itself. Yet, it does not immunize
itself against criticism. It could conceivably be criticized and rejected on its own
terms.
Let us assume that critical rationalists are right and critical rationality is a
useful and comprehensive solution to the problem of rational belief formation.
We can, of course, easily imagine possible worlds in which critical rationality
would not be useful, for instance, just to mention one of many logical possibili-
ties, a world with gods that favor uncritical belief over critical thinking. Useful-
ness implies that critical rationality exploits some features of the actual world,
for instance, that such gods do not exist in the actual world.
If we knew all the features of the actual world exploited by critical rationality,
we could deduce from this knowledge the usefulness of critical rationalism. We
would, then, be in a situation analogous to the city-size example: our knowledge
would provide us with an inductive principle. However, under our assumptions,
this inductive principle must be equivalent to critical rationality; thus, it does
not matter that we do not know it. Moreover, there is no way we could be sure
that the inductive principle is true—as we cannot be sure that there is nothing
better than critical rationality. Anyway, speculation about this unknown induc-
tive principle is not helpful. All we have is, on the one hand, some inductive
principles proposed so far, which have not withstood criticism, and critical ratio-
nality, which has done so.
5. Conclusion
The extension of critical rationality from belief formation to choice of actions
is simple in principle, although the details are not easily worked out.15 The
general idea is that a proposal for the solution of a decision problem is an im-
plicit hypothesis, namely, that implementing the proposal achieves the decision
maker’s goal. It is rational, then, to implement a proposal if and only if it is
rational to believe in the corresponding hypothesis.
In practical decision-making, different solution proposals to the same prob-
lem may be rationally implemented since there may be different courses of ac-
tion achieving the given goals. When several proposals survive criticism equally
15 See Miller 2009 for a discussion of the relevant literature and many important aspects. Miller’s
general perspective is, however, more complicated because he presupposes a much weaker version
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well, no rational decision between them is possible. It is also possible that no
proposal survives criticism, in which case no rational decision exists.
The case where no rational decision exists is a case where the goals may be
criticized. Since people are not transparent to themselves, goals are hypothetical
and criticizable, at least on account of their unattainability or their incompati-
bility.16
Critical rationalism shows more explicit continuity with evolutionary theory
than ecological rationality. It is ﬁrmly embedded in evolutionary epistemology,
which emphasizes the continuity between all kinds of cognitive processes in-
cluding creativity in science and elsewhere (see Bradie and Harms 2008 for a
survey). This leads to a slightly different emphasis in decision theory. For in-
stance, the choice between decision heuristics can be viewed as a process where
several proposals are generated blindly and then criticized until some proposal
survives criticism or time runs out. This is a continuation of the evolutionary
process, where organisms (or genes) can be viewed as embodying hypotheses or
decision rules that are ‘criticized’ by nature whenever they fail to reproduce (or
to reproduce at a higher rate than their competitors).17
Critical rationality, then, is not only relevant in the philosophy of science. It
should also be viewed as the solution to the problem of rational decision-making
and replace Bayesianism, which is not satisfactory in either ﬁeld. Critical ratio-
nality shares the emphasis on evolutionary aspects with ecological rationality,
which has been proposed as an alternative to Bayesianism, or perfect rationality,
in economics. In contrast to critical rationality, however, ecological rationality
cannot serve as a comprehensive conception of rationality.
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